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Abstract

Hans Morgenthau defined international politics as the struggle for power
among nations. Initially power was understood in terms of security and
military supremacy only. But time has proved that military power is only
effective when it is supported by a strong economy. Especially in post-Cold
War era when the world is transforming from uni-polar to multi-polar
world on the basis of competing economic centres, political economy has
attained equal importance at par with the international security studies, if
not more. One of the most important and sensitive area of international
political economy is technology transfer, a life bloodfor modernization of a
developing economy. No doubt the US started relations with China due to
the strategic considerations against the USSR, but it could not ignore the
temptation to capture a market of more than one billion people. For
People's Republic of China (PRC) one of the major objectives for the
opening towards the West was thrust for modern technology for its four
modernisations. In the post-Cold War era, with the demise of the Soviet
Union (USSR), strategic relations lost its relevance and commercial
relations became at the core. Trade, which started from virtually nil,
became multi-fold in J 990s, still was troubled because the United States
(US) was not ready to sale what China wanted for its technological
advancement. The reason was that in the US, technology transfer is carried
out by private actors. But framework, which regulates the technology
transfers, is controlled by the policy makers who could not get rid of the
Cold War mindset that PRC was a communist state, a threat to the 'free
world.' This paper covers the US policy of technology transfer in the
domain of military, nuclear and satellite technology, level of cooperation,
legislations and issues in technology transfers and finally its impact on
bilateral relations. It concludes that the US used technology transfers as a
contrivance to advance its policy goals in China but technology denial led
China to the alternative sources and the US lost its leverage to bargain on
policy options. The US entrepreneurs also had to bear the cost in terms of
lost business.
Key words: technology transfers, military, nuclear, satellite, alternative sources.
Introduction
The policy of technology transfers is used as a mean to promote the national security
and foreign policy objectives of the US. The incentive to transfer or the threat to withhold or
complete refusal of technology transfer is a major tool to influence the policies of target state.
It is also an instrument to punish certain undesired actions of friends or foes or to register
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protest against their policies. The potential of success for this 'economic state craft' depends
on many factors including domestic consensus, the degree of international co-operation and
the vulnerability of the target state. Nonetheless using the technology transfer as an
instrument, policy makers need a careful balancing of competing policy goals, otherwise it
may be counterproductive.
Moreover it is also a difficult task to achieve domestic and
international support simultaneously. A possibility remains always there that the target
country can move to the alternative sources or depends on its own. In that case, sanctions on
technology transfer may lose their effectiveness (Yuan, 1995).
The US policy of technology transfer was no exception. It was designed to balance
two contradictory goals. The first was to protect the national security through restricting the
export of dual use technology that could upgrade the military capabilities of China. The other
was ensuring the promotion of bilateral trade between the two countries. Section I of this
paper gives a brief literature review on the topic. Section II of this article deals with the
normalization of relation and hurdles due to Tiananmen incidence. Section III deals with the
technology transfers in the field of satellite, military and nuclear technologies to PRC, while
section IV discusses the US sanctions on technology transfers to China and China's turn to
alternative sources. The final section concludes the study.
Review of Literature
Tan Qingshan, in his book Making of US-China Policy: From Normalization to the
post-Cold-War Era has evaluated US policy toward China since normalization, exploring the
importance of government institutions, the interactions among those institutions, and the roles
that specific individuals have played in policymaking. According to him, U.S. policy toward
China is not always guided by strategic considerations and that Congress and the bureaucracy
have a critical impact on policy outcomes. He examines the U.S. political process and its
impact on policymaking toward China. He has focused on four case studies: the Taiwan
Relations Act, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S.-China trade agreement and U.S.
technology transfers to China (Qingshan, 1992).
Henry R.Nau,Jack H. Behrman and Harvey W. Wallender in Technology transfer
and US. foreign policyhas examined historical practices associated with the use of U.S.
technology in foreign affairs, whether this use involved strategic, diplomatic, commercial, or
other aims and whether the technology was destined for advanced, socialist, resource-rich, or
resource-poor developing countries. Along with that, it has also examined several specific
case studies of recent technology outflows to various groups of countries. These inquiries
reveal the increasing economic as well as strategic and diplomatic significance of USA
technology in foreign affairs. A framework of policy motives and mechanisms and different
types of technological exports, plus four interesting case studies have been given to describe
in detail how affiliates of large enterprises get technological help not easily obtainable by
others (Nau,Behrman & Wallender, 1976).
Wang Jisi, in China at the CrossroadsSustainability,
Economy, Security and Critical
Issues for the 21st Centwyreflects on Chinese political reform and asks whether or not its
leaders are actively laying the path towards democracy. According to the author, after three
decades of rapid growth, the country now finds itself at an economic, political and foreign
policy crossroads. The fourteen contributors address some of the economic, environmental
and social fragilities that this prosperity and opening up has created (i.e. income inequality,
environmental degradation, excessive trade surpluses), but they maintain their praise for Deng
Xiaoping's economic opening which they credit for making China more prosperous as it
become more politically stable. The writers have addressed the progress made over the past
three decades from revamped tax, banking, pension, legal and regulatory systems, new
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infrastructure such as high-speed railways systems, jobs, and assisting the world through
investment and trade. However, the economic growth and openness has created a far more
complex, demanding and complicated society, as well as created complications with its
neighbours and the west. Some fragility has been created by rapid progress such as lack of
access to health and education, environmental degradation, corruption and income inequality.
But at the end they have maintained their praise for Deng Xiaoping's economic opening
which they credit for making China more prosperous as it become more politically stable.
While the examples and means by which China has developed and prospered are well made,
the future progress is blocked by United States led discrimination and political interference,
and an inequitable international order which frames China as a threat (Jisi, 2012).
Rosemary Foot in The Practice of Power: us Relations with ChinaSince 1949has
put together a richly detailed analysis of the change in American relations with China after
1949 from hostility to rapprochement, and to full normalization of the ties in 1979. She has
focused on the relationship after normalization, a period when the United States has come to
view China as less of a challenge but still resistant to certain of the norms ofthe current
international order. The book begins by examining US efforts to build, and then maintain an
international and domestic consensus behind its China policy. It then looks at changing US
perceptions of the capabilities of the Chinese state. It shows how American positions on
Chinese representation at the UN and on the trade embargo were subtly eroded, not least by
changes in US domestic public opinion. The author argues that previous explanations of
American relations with China have narrowly focused on ideas associated with the strategic
triangle and that instead we need to embed our understanding of the evolution of American
relations with China within a wider structure of relationships at the global and domestic level
(Foot, 1995).
Otto Schnepp in the paper U. S. -China Technology Transfer: Problems and
Solutions presents a descriptive portrait of the U.S-China technology transfer process. China
projects of Foxboro (industrial controllers -- a joint venture), Cummins (diesel engines -licensing), and Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering (electric power generation
equipment -- licensing) and promotional policies supporting expanded trade and technology
transfer through fmancing and other means have also been addressed. Apart from that, the
writer has also discussed that Congress reviews overall U.S. foreign policy toward China to
assess the success of past policies and to anticipate future problems and policies toward China
reflect perceptions of the global role of the US (Schnepp, 2008).
Theodor Leuenberger in From Technology Transfer to Technology Management in
China has explained why China has failed
to implement a strategy of expanding its
economic policy. The actual cause behind this failure is not the technologicalproblems
but
the methods, organizational questions, reflexes and attitudes that prevent the use of modem
technologiesin an efficient and profitable manner. Whenever the Chinese talk about foreignmade tools or foreign-designed systems which they are using or have borrowed, they are
always careful of emphasizing Chinese Character. There is a dire need to take an integrated
approach to manage technological development, adopt a coordinated strategy, and continue
and deepen economic and structural reforms (Leuenberger, 2012).
Allan C. Reddy in A Macro Perspective on Technology Transfer has introduced the
concepts related to technology transfer, discussed the major participants in the worldwide
transfer enterprise and presented ways to overcome the barriers in technology transfer. He has
emphasized on the need for, and methods to, transfer technology to LDCs, provided ways to
analyze the costs, and presented a model of reciprocal distribution that may benefit both the
donor and the recipient country in the transfer process. According to him, the key to
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economic success, particularly for the less developed countries of the world, is technology-but only when properly applied. Despite years of help through technology transfer, however,
many LDCs are still impoverished because either the wrong technologies were transferred or
the right ones were not transferred. The countries can improve their economic growth through
technology transfer, by assimilating technology into their socioeconomic and cultural
structures that is critical to their economic development, not the indiscriminate borrowing
from advanced nations (Reddy, 1996).
From the normalisation, in 1979, the US technology transfer policies reflected that
the benefits of increased technology sales to China had overcome the risks. The restrictions
on high technology exports to China had gradually been eased through the Export
Administration Act amendments of 1977. This act in its amended form relaxed 'the equally
restrictive trade policy' towards all socialist countries. It also empowered the US President to
regulate trade with different communist countries. President Carter used the provision to shift
China from the more restrictive trade classification of country group Y, to a new
classification, country group P. This classification was created especially for China while the
previous classification was reserved for Soviet bloc. This new classification enabled the
Department of Commerce to facilitate the sale of high-technology civilian goods with
possible military applications to PRC (Qingshan, 1992, p 116-17).
President Reagan, in continuation of the policies initiated by his predecessor, further
liberalised technology transfer to China. The administration issued a directive allowing the
sale of high technology and equipment to China at technology levels, twice to those approved
for the USSR. The administration further reformed the policy of technology transfer to China,
moving it from country group P to country group V. It was the same trade classification,
given to Japan and Western Europe. But to block free flow of technology at par with above
mentioned countries a new 'zone system' was established. The goal was to restrict certain
kind of exports to China, in the national security interest and to speed up the review of
applications for non-sensitive exports by providing clear guideline to licensing review
officers. Interagency steering group on technology transfer to China established the three
guidelines. Those guidelines included the green zone-routine licensing approval, the
intermediate or yellow zone case-by-case license review; and the red zone-most advanced
technologies sensitive to national security. The US Commerce Department reviewed the cases
falling in the first category, the green zone. Those falling in the yellow zone were reviewed
by both Department of Defence and the Department of Commerce on case-by-case basis.
Those enlisted in the red zone were considered by the Department of Defence and the
Department of State both, deemed as a substantial threat to the US national security (Hanshan
& Morrison, 2000).
The commerce Department highlighted seven commodity areas for special attention
in license reviews. These seven areas consisted of three-quarters of US export license
applications for China. They were computers, computerised
instruments,
recording
equipment, semiconductor production equipment, microcircuits, electronic instruments, and
oscilloscopes. For the red zone items, no list had been published. According to the State
Department, red zone included nuclear weapons and delivery systems. It also included
technologies and equipment used for intelligence activities, electronic warfare, antisubmarine
warfare, power projection and avionics (Hanshan & Morrison, 2000).
The new policy ended the confusion of the double standards and accelerated the
process of bureaucratic reviews for licenses. Consequently the administration approved about
2,000 cases worth about $500 million for exports to China in 1982. While in 1983, it
approved over 3,000 cases worth over $1 billion. Next year in 1984, the administration
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approved 5,000 cases with the total value of about $2 billion. Despite these approvals,
double-standard treatment with regard to technology transfer to China continued. Although
China was kept under category V, albeit most of the dual use technology transfer cases
continued to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis (Hanshan & Morrison, 2000). This policy
continued till 1989 when the Tiananmen incidence hampered the process.
Post-Tiananmen

Sanctions and their Implications

The Tiananmen incidence (BBC News, 1989)1 ended the domestic support in the US
for pro-China policy. Bush (Sr.) administration responded the Tiananmen incident by
introducing a series of sanctions against China. First, the administration suspended all the
high level exchanges. They announced a complete ban on military sales to China with
immediate effect (Yuan, 2003f These sanctions also affected commercial exports of dual use
technology items to China which were on the US Munitions Control List (MCL).
Bush (Sr.) administration further controlled the processing of green zone cases. It
also proposed such control by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM) members. The suspension of all high-level government
exchanges was
accompanied by prohibitions on loans to China from Export Import Bank programme;
Overseas
Private
Investment
Corporation;
withholding
International
Development
Association loans; and opposition to loans from multilateral development banks including the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (Yuan, 1996, p 317-18).
The suspension of advanced technology transfer had a serious consequence on
China's struggle to modernise its high technology industries. The civilian industries
particularly the aerospace, computer, electronics, nuclear energy and telecommunications
sector fell in trouble. However these sanctions were tough in outlook but swift in nature. They
did not lead to the complete reversal of United States' technology policy. One reason was that
the Bush administration was convinced that the demise of Soviet threat did not end the
significance of China in the post-Cold War security environment. China's active participation
and co-operation in handling and resolving a number of issues having security concerns to the
US were appreciated by the US administration. China's stand on Gulf-War, peace on Korean
peninsula and political settlement in Cambodia were appreciated as supportive for the US
foreign policy. President Bush sent Brent Scowcroft, his National Security Advisor, and
Lawrence Eagleburger, his Deputy Secretary of State (Bush, 2011)immediately
after
Tiananmen, to China though the official exchanges remained suspended. It was the evidence
of engagement policy and continuity of constructive dialogue (Washington Post, 1989).
The other reason was the economic costs of the sanctions. The COCOM allies
agreed that the military sales to China should be banned adopting strict policy in future. At
the same time, the US was aware of the strong reaction from the members if the past
agreements were rolled back. Without allies' co-operation, unilateral action by United States

'Demonstrators, mostly students, were demanding for democratic reform occupied the
Tiananmen Square for seven weeks. They refused to move until their demands were met.
PLA moved into the square from several directions, late on 3 June 1989, randomly firing on
unarmed protesters, killing hundreds of civilians.
2Those included four major government to government projects: the $62.5 million An/TPQ37 artillery locating radar packages; Mark-46 Mod-2 anti-submarine torpedoes worth $8.5
million; $28.5 million program to upgrade two 155 mm ammunition production facilities and
the $550 million Project Peace Pearl to upgrade the avionics for China's F-8 fighter
interceptor.
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proved to be ineffective. Specially restrictions on exports of certain items based on their endusers or expected end-user, for example crime control and detection equipment for which the
Chinese military and police force may be the end users, could not be effective without
securing similar allied action. It would be both ineffective and costly. It was estimated that
technology denial would result in a loss of $5 billion annually to the US business, since China
was expected to switch over to the alternative sources (Yuan, 1996. pp. 320-21).
Therefore both the US and COCOM either modified or liberalised the technology
transfer sanctions, keeping the strategic and economic consideration of the US-China
relations but the policy of preferential treatment was changed after the Tiananmen incidence.
For example, when the Commerce Department lifted restrictions on computer sales to
outlawed destination, China was also the beneficiary. Similarly when COCOM, in 1991,
further liberalised control on a majority of the East European countries, the China preferential
continued to exist, though on papers only. In fact except for 1989, technology transfer to
China continued to ease slowly and steadily between 1990-93.
Bush administration allowed the delivery of four Boeings 757 commercial jetliner to China,
worth $200 million in July 1989. After three months, the administration allowed the Chinese
military officers and technicians to return to their assignment at the US facilities to restore
upgrading programme of F-8. The US President used his presidential waiver authority on at
least seven occasions to allow the sale of US built satellite to China. The FMS equipment
placed in storage for more than three years, due to ban on military sales was released for
shipment in the last days of Bush administration (Yuhan, 1996).
US SATELLITE

EXPORT

TO CHINA (1988-98)

Under the sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen Square incidence in 1989, satellite
export to China either for launch or for sale was subjected to presidential waivers. Since
1991, Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton issued eleven waivers allowing the export of
satellites to China for launches, including three from the former and eight from the later.
China had launched twenty US-made satellites for the US, itself, and others. The presidential
waivers enabled the US satellite manufacturer companies to take advantage of China's
cheaper space launch prices.'
Although the US president was considerate towards China but the Congress
responded aggressively on Tiananmen Square incidence. It passed Foreign Relations
Authorisation Act (P.L. 101-246, Section-902), under the FY 1990 (P.L. 101-162) and the
1990-91 imposing strict sanctions on the export of US built satellites to China. Since the
communication satellites were also enlisted in the military item list therefore they were also
kept under the US State Department's Munitions List (MCL). The President could waive the
sanctions on the certification that it was in the US national interest or he might grant a waiver
by reporting the US Congress 'that China had achieved certain political and human right
reforms.' This wavier was granted three times by the US president 1989-1992 in the name of
national interests to allow many satellite project with China. However political analysts took
it as a conciliatory move, to compensate China for the sale ofF-16s to Taiwan.

3The

Chinese prices were much lower ranging from $12 million to $70 million per launch,
than those charged by the US companies, ranging from $50 million to over $100 million per
launch.
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The US government again revived sanctions on August 25, 1993, due to China's
ballistic missile proliferation activities. During this period acute tension was observed
between the US business and policy makers. Businessmen' had viewpoint that the sanctions
would destroy the US business interests while the policy makers believed that the sensitive
technology should not be exported to China. The centre of debate was the control of the
satellite export. The first category included the satellite manufacturers and those in favour of
American business like Hughes and Lockheed Martin wanted its regulation by the Commerce
Department's Control List. The second included the Congressmen, foreign office bureaucrats,
old cold warrior and some in media wanted that it should be administer through the State
Department's Munitions List. The issue was settled in favour of first group when in October
1996, primary responsibilities were transferred to the Commerce Department (Miller, 1998).
President Clinton allowed the export of China Sat 8 on the pretext of national interest in 1998
(Jr Fisher, 1998). Therefore Sino-US commercial space cooperation remained active and
CGWIC successfully launched 26 US satellites into space. However, this cooperation ceased
after June 1999when the US tightened its export controls following the Cox Report, which
accused China of "illegally obtaining" US space technology (Report of the selected
committee of the House of Representatives)."
Under the new policy, the US Congress passed a law "US International Traffic in
Arms Regulations" in 1999 that placed all space-related hardware and services, regardless of
sophistication or availability, on the U.S. Munitions List.' This law adversely affected US
satellite sales in the global market. Before the ban, some countries in Africa, Asia and Latin
America preferred using China's satellite launch service for its relatively low costs and high
success rate. But after the ban, as China could no longer launch satellites that use US satellite
technologies therefore, some of those countries opted to buy satellites that were manufactured
in Europe or China without ITAR-controlled components. Since 2005, China has made and
launched communications satellites for Nigeria, Pakistan and Venezuela, and launched a
number of satellites made by European companies for international clients. This law could
not stop China's space advancement, rather helped to increase sales of Chinese made
satellites. Realizing the recurring loss to the US business, Congress finally abolished it in
2013.
In order to stimulate commercial space sector, US export control rules were further
revised in 2013 and a new law "National Defense Authorization Act" was passed that
removed satellites and related items from the US Munitions List (Borst, Sarkani & Mazzuchi,
2012). But still the US satellite hardware cannot be transferred to China, North Korea or to
any countries that are considered state sponsors of terrorism. Chinese government and
aerospace industry were disappointed on this law. They urged the US administration and
Congress to review its Cold War mindset and separate an entirely commercial activity from
politics. Shen Danyang, official spokesman of Chinese government, lamented that "The US
has not fulfilled its promise to benefit China in its reform of the export control system and
boost exports of high-tech equipment to China, the US rolled out measures to hinder satellite
cooperation for civil purposes between the two countries." ProfessorZhou Shijian," analyzing
US foreign policy also said that this law is not in conformity with US's stated policy of

This committee was established to investigate charges of theft and illegal satellite
technology transfer by the US companies to China.
5This list is a registry of sensitive technologies whose exports are tightly controlled by the US
Department of State.
6Professor Zhou Shijian, a senior trade expert and professor at Tsinghua University, China.
72
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cooperation with China. He further stated that China is not an enemy to the US and putting
restrictions on China is not in mutual interests of both nations (Dingding, 2013).
Military and Nuclear Technology

Transfer

After the diplomatic recognition in 1979, China was expecting that the US would
help its military modernisation by providing sophisticated arms and advanced technology. But
the US Congress and administration were not accepting the idea to fulfil the demand of arms
supplies to a communist regime. However, the US did not hinder the Chinese defence
purchases from its allied countries but avoided direct military exports (Nolt, 200 I).
Nonetheless China was also not prepared to join any formal defence pact with the US, but at
least they were anticipating that under the strategic partnership, the US should help in
replacing their obsolete arsenal by western modem weapons to attain military balance with
the Soviet Union.
The US position was clear. It was willing to export technology but for civilian use
only. Many policy makers had deep concerns that the transfer of dual-use technology to
China would facilitate its military modernisation (Holtand Nikitin, 2015). Some policy
makers and Congressmen also had strong apprehensions about the military capabilities of
China and considered any effort to modernise Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) of China as a
threat to the US interests in Asia. Therefore, it opposed transfer of any type of military
technology to China (Report of The Commission To Assess The Ballistic Missile Threat To
TheUnited States, 1998).
On the other hand China, keeping Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 and US unilateralism
in Iraq, expedited its already continued military modernisation from an army for 'protracted
wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, "highintensity conflicts against high-tech adversaries" based on information warfare (Stumbaum,
2009) In order to modernize its military, China decided to achieve two objectives. First, was
to invest in tactical aviation and naval assets especially in carrier fleet to advance military
capabilities of PLA Navy. China's anti-access denial (A2/AD) strategy prioritized
investments in a number of areas including the development
of advanced missile
technologies, launching a robust network of intelligence and developing counter-space
capabilities. Second, was to develop the defence industry not only to expand Chinese
influence through defence exports but also to acquire self-sufficiency (Nurkin, at.e!. 2014).
China's steady and significant modernisation was supported by increased investment. The
officialdefence budget grew from $20 billion in 2000 to $148 billion in 2014 and is estimated
to reach $189 billion by 2018. Currently, China's growing indigenous capability is increasing
in the field of military aviation, shipbuilding, missile development, and space and its reliance
on foreign technology has been considerably reduced. Now, China needs limited foreign
technology to fill capability gaps, particularly around engines, advanced radars, and guidance
systems (Nurkin, at.e!. 2014).
Although the US, constrained by the threat of terrorism, wanted China to cooperate
in war against terrorism, however, it also felt threatened by Chinese efforts to procure high
technology considering it a potential challenge to its interests in Asia; therefore it refused to
cooperate in this regard. It was also apprehensive about the security of Taiwan as China could
militarily take over the Iceland with a strong PLA.
Prospects for the US Nuclear Industries
China's ambitious plans for its nuclear modernisation in 1980s created new
prospects for foreign nuclear industry to export nuclear technology to China. The nuclear
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technology development for peaceful had been given top priority in China's sixth and seventh
five-year plans for the years 1981-85 and 1986-90. They were interested in purchasing
foreign nuclear technology, equipment and engineering services for most of their projects.
China declared the plan to generate 10,000 MW through ten nuclear power plants, by the end
of the century, to meet the increasing energy demands (Qingshan, 1992, p, 324).These nuclear
projects presented attractive prospects for the US companies. Chinese wanted to deal with the
US companies directly because the US was virtually the first to transfer the nuclear
technology through the sale of complete nuclear plant. Although the French, German, and
Japanese designs were based on the US nuclear reactors models but the latter had certain
advantage being the original one. But in the absence of an agreement for nuclear cooperation
with China, the US companies were not able to participate in the Chinese nuclear project bids.
Despite their deep interest, they lost the opportunities to their competitors. The US companies
did their best to persuade the Chinese authorities to defer their decisions about giving
contracts, for two 900MW units, to French and British companies until they would be in a
position to participate in the bid. Chinese authorities could not help, since there were no
prospects of a US-China nuclear agreement in early 1985 (Ibid.).
Even after signing of the US-China nuclear deal in later half of 1985 it could not be
implemented till 1997. The primary cause for non-implementation of the nuclear agreement
had been the controversial issues of China's 'arms sales and technology transfer in the late
1980s.' The American Secretary of State, George Shultz and the Secretary of Defence, Frank
Carlucce, visited China in July, and September 1988 respectively. The prime motive was to
convey the United State's serious concern over arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia, and
planned sales to Syria. The sanctions were lifted on the assurance from Beijing that China
would make no future military technology exports (Yuan, 1996, p 324).
The US policy makers remained suspicious about China's involvement in
proliferation activities in the regions, which the US considered volatile for the world's
balance of power (CNN News, 1998). They used technology transfers as a policy instrument
to check China's proliferation activities. Under the engagement policy both governments
continued dialogue. As a result China agreed to sign international covenant on nonproliferation of nuclear and missile technology but the US Congress remained dubious about
nuclear technology transfer to China therefore, no US President could issue the necessary
certification required under P.L. 99-183. In 1997, Clinton became the first who issued the
required certification
enabling the implementation
of that agreement
with China
(Dumbaugh,2007). It showed the sign of improvement in bilateral security-relations.
No significant progress in bilateral nuclear relations was seen under Bush (Jr.)
administration. His successor President Obama announced, in 2009, that a US-China nuclear
partnership is essential to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."
But the tension could not be eased and there was no practicality at official level. The Belfer
Center's Managing the Atom (MT A) Project, in 2010, took the initiative to find out the
solution to the problem and start 'US-China cooperation across a broad agenda of issues.'?
These negotiations included both "the US and Chinese approaches to prevent nuclear
terrorism; Chinese nuclear weapons policies and perspectives on the US nuclear posture;
reactions to the Prague arms control agenda; opportunities for strengthening cooperation on
non-proliferation; and China's nuclear energy and commercial reprocessing plans." At a point

?These "discussions were part of an ongoing MT A research initiative on China's nuclear
policies, led by Zhang, and made possible by generous support from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation."
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when the US needed China's support to extend the UN sanctions on Iraq and wanted its
participation in the Nuclear Security Summit such dialogues were considered, a move to
address the trust deficit of both sides on each other and to suggest good policy options to the
policymakers of both nations (Malin, 2010).
The move proved successful and in January 2011 both the countries decided to
construct the Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security in Beijing. Work on the project started
in October 2013 and is expected to be completed in 2015. This project would help China to
increase its domestic nuclear-security capability It will house environmental laboratory space,
test sites and areas where atomic- security professionals can drill in their crisis-responses
techniques. The centre also will include a focus on combating the illegal sale of atomic
technologies (Working Began on Nuclear Security Centre in China, 2013).
Nuclear cooperation between the two countries is strengthening under Obama
administration. Current areas of the cooperation include fostering common interests in nuclear
energy collaboration among the US and Chinese scientists, laboratories, research institutes,
and universities, extraction of uranium from seawater, and nuclear hybrid energy systems.
Besides, both the countries are also cooperating in nuclear safety field including exchange of
technical information, research results and experience exchange of personnel for visits and
assignments; exchange of equipment, materials and instrumentation; and joint training,
seminars, conferences, and workshops (Steering Committee Meeting of US-China Bilateral
Action Plan, 2014).
NON-PROLIFERA TION AND US SANCTIONS
. From 1989 to 1993, the United States imposed a number of highly publicised
sanctions as a reaction to China's proliferation activities to the Third World including sales of
M-9 and M-ll missiles to Pakistan. The US administration denied export licenses for highspeed computers to China because of violation of the Missile Control Regime (MTCR)
guideline. The White House also announced more restricted approval of export licenses for
the computers exceeding a certain level (New York Times, 1991).
In 1992, China signed an agreement to build two 300-megawatt nuclear reactors in
Iran. Western media was suspecting a civilian cover for weapons programme (Gill, 1993).
Sanctions on the export of high technology against China were lifted when it agreed to sign
NPT, in 1992, providing written assurances to the US that it 'would adhere to the guidelines
of MTCR.' Therefore the US government lifted. But the tension revived when in response to
the reports of alleged technology transfer· of M-11 missiles, Bush administration reconsidered
the transfer of Cray supercomputer to China (Rennack,2006). In 1993, the Director of Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), James Woolsey, testified that "it is not clear whether Beijing has
broken off contacts with elements associated with Pakistan's weapons program" (Reiss &
Litwak, 1994: pp, 148-49).
Despite frictions in relationship the overall policies of US administration continued
the patterns of engagement. It also allowed the sale of 'computers with data processing speed
up to 67 million theoretical operations per second (MTOPS). 'The US Commerce Department
approved the export of Allied Signal Garrett TFE 731-2A turbofan engine to China despite
the strong protest of the US Department of Defence and Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. This agreement licensed the production of this engine in China and it was to 'power
the K-8 jet trainer.' But the suspicion that these engines 'could be used in Chinese cruise
missiles' soured the project. Till the end of 1995, the licensed production was blocked, but 33
engines were handed over to China (Yuan, 1996).
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The license was issued for the sophisticated Cray supercomputers worth $8 million,
previously blocked by the Bush (Sr.) administration. Although these computers were to be
used for weather forecast by China's State Meteorological Administration but the technology
had military application also. It could be used in nuclear and ballistic missile development
(Gill,1998).
Clinton administration preferred to keep China engage through dialogue. Both
nations agreed to adopt a step-by-step approach to resolve differences over missile exports,
nuclear technology and to cooperate in banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons (Gill, 1998). China, although did not formally sign but promised to adhere to
"Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and agreed to Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT)." In 1996, it also signed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Next year in 1997, China also joined the Zanger
Committee of NPT exporters. In return Clinton administration lifted the sanctions 'under the
Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act' (Russia's Road to Corruption,
2000).
High-level exchanges from both sides also facilitated the bilateral energy and
defence conversion cooperation accords. As a result the advanced US technology transfers
were expected in areas such as the generation of nuclear power and dual-use air-traffic control
systems. The US Secretary of Defence William Perry's visit to China for presiding over the
meeting of the 'Sino-US Joint Commission on Defence Conversion' helped to enhance
bilateral security relations. But the US Congress's suspicion remained there (Tyson, 1997).
In order to curb nuclear proliferation by China, President Clinton signed a nuclear
cooperation accord with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, during his state visit to the US
(Durnbaugh, 1998). This agreement was a US move to facilitate the US nuclear firms an
access to the multibillion-dollar Chinese market (Tyson, 1997) which they lost to their
competitors. This agreement was subject to certification by the US president that China was
not giving assistance to any country in acquiring nuclear weapons. Earlier, China also
promised to export only those nuclear facilities that were open to the international monitoring.
China further agreed in a separate agreement to bring its regulations on the export of nuclear
and nuclear related technology into line with international standards. New regulations were
published in 1997 (Weeks, 1997).
The nuclear agreement provided the legal framework for the sales of nuclear
reactors, fuel and components. It also established the basis for cooperation in a variety of
applications for the peaceful use of nuclear' technology, and the exchange of high technology
in the field of health and safety (US-China Nuclear cooperation agreement, 1985). With the
enforcement of this agreement, the US companies were authorised to export the nuclear
technology. It helped to enhance the bilateral trade and also minimise the trade deficit for the
US (Tyson, 1997).
After terrorist attacks in September 2000, United States revised its policy on PRC
weapons proliferation. From 2002-2008 the US kept on pressurizing China to use its
influence on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons. China organised six-party talks
but it did not produce any results. Since 2006, China has adopted a balanced approach and
voted for some United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against missile or nuclear
proliferation in North Korea and Iran. However after North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006,
2009 and 2013 US policy-makers reconsidered about how to change China's calculus and the
value of its cooperation. China has continued its balanced approach and voted in favour of
UNSC resolutions to impose or expand sanctions in 2009, 2010 and 2013. Disagreement
developed when China wanted to resume the six party talks, but Obama administration was
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not ready to accept less than complete denuclearization
of North Korea. Obarna
administration also wanted China to reduce crude oil imports from Iran and cooperate in
reducing missile proliferation in Iran, North Korea and Syria (Kan, 2014). These moves had
positiveimpact on bilateral relations.
'
Alternative Sources, the Other Way-out

for China

Both China and the US have divergent views on the issue of technology transfers.
Chineseofficials did not see the denial of technology transfer consistent with the engagement
policy. They had insisted that the technology transfer should be a part of normalisation. The
denialon the part of the US had created suspicion about the motives of the engagement policy
in China. Under such circumstances, the use of technology transfer as a policy instrument to
enhance the US foreign policy goals was a very difficult job for the US administration (Kan,

2014).
Growing economic and technological collaboration between Third World and China
as well as close ties with the western countries proved to be a challenge for the US' export
control policy. China's engagement in various co-production and co-development projects in
defence areas with these countries provided it access to the advanced western military
technologies. For example, China, France and Singapore had been engaged in a codevelopment project to design a new helicopter since 1990. The project involved most
sophisticated substantial technology transfer in the field of avionics (Defense News, 1990).
There are examples .when China turned to the alternative suppliers mostly western countries
in retaliation to the technology denial from the US, the French and German companies were
the beneficiaries in the form of joint ventures while, the US aerospace companies were the
losers (Yuan, nd. P. 331-335). In the twenty-first century, when the Chinese scientists are
making strides in their relevant fields, the European countries fmd it inevitable to collaborate
withChina in scientific research (Brook, nd).
China also used its arm sales relations with the Third World countries to have access
to advanced western military technologies. It is believed in the US that China had accessed
the American and French weapon technologies in jet fighters, Mirage and F-16, air to air
(Sidewinder and Magic) anti-tank missiles (TOW), ship to ship Exocet, and aerial refuelling
system from its allies like Pakistan, Iran, Egypt etc. The US export control policy proved to
be helpless in this area (Brook, nd).
Effective control over re-export ·of sensitive products and technology has been
another problematic area for the US. The news of reported Israeli technology transfers and reexports to China, shocked the US due to its close ties with Israel. These transfers included
advanced tank armours, air-borne early warning radar system, various types of missile and
anti-missile system, defence electronics and space program (Israel has stabbed America in the
back, 1999). Such issues continued to surface from time to time; in 1992 about Israeli
transfer of Patriot missile technology to China (Washington Times, 1992)8 and in 1995 about
Israeli contract to sale Lavi technology. In 1996, China signed to buy a prototype aircraft
which was built by Israel with US technology and funding. It was having Airborne Early
Warning and Command and Control (AEW) radar system that could monitor up to a reported

8Ihe

State Department Inspector-General and US government intelligence agencies had been
investigating unauthorized Israeli technology transfers to China, South Africa, Ethiopia,
Chile, and other countries. Israeli leaders denied that Israel transferred US technology without
US permission, and denied violating US-Israeli agreements on weapons security and
transfers.
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200 targets simultaneously, at a range of 250 miles (400 km), as well as target surface
installations, and gather communications intelligence" (CRS Report, 2000). It was scheduled
to hand over first plane to China in October 2001. The US warned Israel that this system in
the hands of China would be dangerous especially if China attacked Taiwan. Israeli officials
rejected the US interference referring to the sale of Airborne Warning and Control
System(A WACS) to Saudi Arabia by the US over the protest of Israel. Israel argued that
China could buy AEW from Britain or France and Israel would lose the income from the sale.
But the US administration took no action to block $250 million military aid to Israel in case
of its refusal to cancel the deal with China.
Similarly, the US had close economic ties with Hong-Kong. Hong-Kong's economy
was based on trade and high technology transactions. The US had to impose export control on
Hong-Kong also to avoid high risk of diversion to mainland China. Since Hong-Kong is now
a part of China, the new US guidelines to treat Hong-Kong differently, created confusion and
also provoked reaction from the Chinese government (Goldstein, 1993, p, 120). Technology
available to Hong Kong is also within the reach of China.
CONCLUSION

Technology transfer was a need of China for economic development. It was also a
source of achieving economic as well as political goals. The US had been using it as a source
of achieving policy goals in the early post-Cold War period with considerable success. But
the economic cost of these sanctions compelled Washington to review these polices, time and
again. Clinton administration liberalised the export control even on dual use technology
transfer to China to avoid the economic losses to the US business.
The same considerations convinced the administration to use presidential waiver
many times for the export of high technology. Many economic analysts declared it as an
opening of a multi-billion dollar trade for the US nuclear technology sector that they lost in
the previous years to their competitors France, Germany, Japan etc. Despite the continued
sanctions on military technology sales to China military-to-military relations continued
between the two countries with a few setbacks.
In the new millennium the US had to face enormous challenges to its security and
pre-eminence. China as the emerging power with increasing influence across the continents
was also taken as one of the major challenges to the US strategic designs. But at the same
time need for strategic engagement and economic cooperation was also realised by the US
policy makers. Therefore George W. Bush ·(Jr.)continued the policy of engagement to resolve
the political and economic issues in bilateral relations. Despite the major setback due to
bombing in 1999 by NATO forces on Chinese embassy in Belgrade and issue of the US spy
plane at the start of new millennium, both nations adopted the conciliatory posture towards
each other. The cooperation in the field of trade and direct foreign investment continued
along with the denial in high technology transfers.
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 further enhanced the need of bilateral
relations and President Bush (Jr.) administration decided to ensure China's cooperation in
combating terrorism. China also showed positive response and contributed both by extending
political support and economic help in rehabilitation of Afghanistan after the defeat of
Taliban.
The US technology control was retrenched following the Cox Committee's report in
1999 over the dual-use satellite technology sale to or launching from China. Consequently the
European space industries filled the gap over-riding the US prohibitions. The ultimate losers
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were the US companies which lost the access to a huge potential market. The Chinese
leadership concluded that they could draw geostrategic benefits 'from being a partner on the
ISS,' symbolic of the "international family of space faring nations." The US 'stiff-arming'
behaviour compelled China for 'developing its own space station' (Green, 2009).
With the inauguration of Obama in White House, the new US President preferred
dialogue to manage China as a non-challenging power especially in Asia-Pacific in strategic
terms and in the world in economic terms. For this purpose, military-to-military talks were
resumed. Nonetheless the basic points of disagreements continued to haunt the bilateral
relationship. The US demanded more transparency in development of PLA and insisted to
address future prospects of 'military maritime incidents.'
The US was not ready to accept the 'PLA's pursuit of area denial and anti-access strategies,
including growing threats to US carrier battle groups, satellites and cyberspace (Yuan, 2003).
More transparency can help to confidence-building efforts but much more is required to settle
down the issues amicably. Its allies in the region including Japan and Australia also shared
the US concerns. In order to balance the expanded deployments of 4th generation fighter
aircraft by PLA Air Force, Obama administration decided to continue arms sales to Taiwan
especially the F-16s, which according to the US are 'critical to maintaining necessary
defensive capabilities against China's takeover of Taiwan (Green, 2009).
Countering Obama's policy of extended space cooperation, the US Congress
imposed protectionist legislations on China to block such cooperation with China. For
instance, 'section 1340 of NASA's budget prohibited NASA and the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from spending funds to "develop, design, plan,
promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind
to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chineseowned company.'" The hosting of "official Chinese visitors" at any NASA facility was also
restricted. Clear intension of this prohibition was to proscribe the US-China space
cooperation. China also responded aggressively as Professor Johnson-Freese noted that those
who were supporters of ban thought that "Chinese space officials are anxiously banging on
the proverbial US door, waiting and hoping for the opportunity to work with the United
States-which just isn't the case." He further wrote that most of Chinese space officials took it
as a liability to work with the US on the International Space Station (ISS). Therefore China
preferred to broadly move out on their own in space.
The only goodwill gesture from the US side after Cox Commission's Report was the
visit of NASA Administrator Mike Griffin's in 2006. But overall policy of President Bush
(Jr.) on space cooperation with China had been provocative. Though Obama administration
showed positive signs but about cooperation with China, no US-China concrete plan was
presented by either side or any in the pipeline. On the other hand, there are countries which
are anxious to access China's partnership on space activities. Professor Johnson-Freese wrote
that the "US Congress and Obama administration [are] working together to refocus the US
space program, including realistic cooperation, would go further to maintain the US space
leadership than pointless isolation gestures" (Frees, 2011

t

Obama administration also decided'to establish a Strategic and Economic Dialogue'
with China as a sign of 'building a cooperative framework for managing bilateral relations.'
The "Strategic" part of bilateral negotiations is focused on climate change and energy. The

9Joan Johnson-Freese
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US priorities on the "Economic" part would be expected to be focused on issues of currency,
global imbalances and trade liberalisation.
These discussions helped to create an
understanding
of each other's interests and perspectives.
Obama administration
has
reactivated the Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) (CRS Report, 2011)10
established under the Bush administration as a mode to deal with short term economic issues
in bilateral relations (Joint Press Conference of Gates and General Liang, 2011). At the same
time Congress continued to build up pressure through protectionist amendments to various
China specific bills like punitive tariffs to recent climate change legislation. There is a
realisation in the US policy makers that the strategic and economic dialogue is inevitable to
manage the sensitive relationship between the two powers. There is also a realisation in the
US that China's emerging self sufficiency in military and space technology is a reaction to the
US policy of technology denial to China, which virtually proved counterproductive both in
strategic and economic terms.

iii

References
BBC News. (1989). 1989 Massacre in Tiananmen Square. Retrieved From:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthis
day/hildates/stories/june/4/newsid
2496000/2496277.stm,
20/09/2013.
Brooks
Michael
.
(16
August
2010)
N ewStatesm anhttp://www.newstatesman.com/asial2
science,on 12110/20 14.

on

The
Spark
Rises
in
the
0 1% 8/china-research -chinese-

East.

Borst, Jay Barry., Sarkani, Shahram., Mazzuchi, Thomas. (2012). Acquisition: US Space
Challenges in the Final Frontier. ARJ. 9(1), pp. 75-98.
Bush, H.W. (2011). Retrieved from: www.con"servapedia.com/George.
21103/2014.
CNN. (1998). Technology
30/12/2014.
Defense News. (Washington)

Transfer.

Retrieved

Retrieved on

from: http//www.cnnlus/china.satellite,

on

19 February 1990, 33.

Department of Defense. Joint Press Conference with Secretary Gates and General Liang from
Beijing, China. (2011).
Retrievedfromhttp://www .defense. gov /transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=4 75 O.
Dingding, Xin. (2013).US urged to relax satellite export restrictions. China Daily. Retrieved
fromhttp://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/world/20
13-0 1I07/content 16089553.htm. on
22/06/2014.
Dumbaugh, Kerry. (1998). US-China Relations. CRS Brief. Retrieved from
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/980717CRSRelations.htm.
on 25/5/2001.

laThe Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), established in 1983 as a high-level
forum for discussion of bilateral trade issues. Like the S&ED, it is headed on the U.S. side by
two cabinet-level officials, in the case of the JCCT, the Secretary of Commerce and the
United States Trade Representative. Their Chinese-side counterpart is China's Vice Premier
for foreign trade. The JCCT currently includes ten working groups covering trade and
investment issues, business development and industrial cooperation, and commercial law, with
a side dialogue on export controls.
80

Published by iRepository, June 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol10/iss2/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54784/1990-6587.1354
Business Review - Volume 10 Number 2

July - December

2015

Dumbaugh, Kerry.(2007).China-U.S.
Relations: Current Issues and Implications for US.
Policy.
Retrieved
fromopencrs. com/ document/RL33877 /2007-10-01/ downloadl 1005, on
22/12/2013.
Foot, Rosemary. (1995). The Practice of Power: US Relations with China Since 1949. Oxford
University Press. Oxford.
Freese, Johnson Joan. (2011). US-China Space Cooperation: Congress' Pointless Lockdown.
Retrievedfrom:http://www.chinausfocus:comlpeace-securitv/us-china-space-ooperationcongress%E2% 80% 99-pointless-lockdownl.
Gill, Bates, R. (1993). The Challenges
1990s. Strategic studies institute, p 8-9.

of Chinese Arms Proliferation:

US Policy for the

Gill, Bates. (June 22, 1998). U.S.-China Technology Transfer: Annotated Timeline
January 1998. Retrieved fromhttp://www.nyu.edulglobalbeatlasia/china/0622198gill.html,
25/5/2001.
Goldstein, M. Steven. (1993). China at the Cross-Roads.
York

1980on

Henry Luce Foundation Inc. New

Green, J. Michael. (2009). US China relations under Obama. The Brooking Institution. Paper
was presented in 38th Taiwan-U'S. Conference on Contemporary China.
Hanshan, Charles., Morrison, Wayne. (2000). United States and China. Retrieved
http//usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/crsmemo.html,
on 21103/2014.

from

Holt, Mark and Nikitin, Mary Beth D. (May 6, 2015). The US-China Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement. CRS Report. Retrieved from https://www.fas.orglsgp/crs/row/RL33192.pdf
http//www.ksgnotes I.Harvard.edulBCSIAILibrary.nsf/pubs/US-ChiNuclear, on 22/06/2001.
Investigation ofIsraeli's

transfer of technology. (1992). The Washington Times.

Israel has stabbed America in the back. (1999). Retrieved fromhttp://zog,to/3/zogl111199Ic.htm, on 12/10/2010.
Israel's Sale of Airborne Early Warning Aircraft to China. (2000). CRS Report RS20583.
Jisi, Wang (Ed.). (2012). China at the Crossroads: Sustainability, Economy, Security and
Critical Issues for the 21st Century. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Jr. Fisher, D. Richard. (1998). Commercial Space Cooperation should not Harm National
Security. Retrieved
From:
http://www.heritage.orglresearch/reports/1998/06/bgI198escommercial-space- cooperationnbspnbsp, on 12/09/2011.
Kan, Shirley, A. (2014). China and Proliferation of weapons of mass
Congressional
Research
service.
Retrieved
https://www.fas.orglsgp/crs/nuke/RL315
55.pdf,0n22/6/20 14.

destruction.
from

Leuenberger, Theodor. (2012). From Technology Transfer to Technology Management in
China. Springer Science & Business Media. New York.
Malin, Martin. (2010)US.-China
Experts Meet to Strengthen Nuclear Cooperation.
Center Newsletter. Harvard Cannedy School.

Belfer

Meeting ofthe Steering Committee of US-China Bilateral Action Plan. (2014). Retrieved
from: http://energy.gov/ne/intemational-nuclear-energy-policy-and-cooperation/bilateralcooperation, on 12/06/14.
Miller,
Das.
(1998).
Technology
http//:www.usinfo/gov.on 06/4/2014.

Transfer

to

China.

Retrieved

From:

Nau, R. Henry., Behrman, H. Jack., Wallender, W. Harvey. (1976). Technology transfer and
US foreign. Praeger Publishers. New York.
New York Times. (1 May 1991)., p. AI.
81

Published by iRepository, June 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol10/iss2/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54784/1990-6587.1354
Business Review - Volume 10 Number 2
Nolt,
H.
James.
(2001).
US-China
Security
http://www.foteignpolicy-Infocus.org/briefs/vo113/v3n19chi

2015

July - December

Relations.
Retrieved
From:
body.html, on
22/06/2014.

Nurkin, Tate., Burton, Paul., Skomba, Tom. & Hardy, James. (19 May 2014). The Global
Implications of China's military modernization. IHS Quarterly. Retrieved
fromhttp://www.ihs.comltVquarterly/features/chinas-military-modernization.aspx,
on
22/06/2014.
Qingshan, Tan. (1992). The Making ofU.S. China Policy: From Normalization
Cold War Era. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boulder.

to the Post-

Reddy, C. Allan. (1996). A Macro Perspective on Technology Transfer. Greenwood
Publishing Group. Portsmouth.
Reiss, Mitchell & Litwak, S. Robert. (1994). Nuclear Proliferations
Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. Washington D.C.
Rennack,
E.
Dianne,
(2006).
China:
Economic
https:llwww.fas.orglsgp/crs/row/RL31910.pdf.
28.

after the Cold War

Sanctions.

CRS

Report.

Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. (1998).
Retrieved from: http://www.fas.org/irp/threatlbm-threat.htm.
Report of the selected committee of the House of Representatives. U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial
Concerns with the People's Republic of China. Retrieved From:
http://www.house.gov/coxreportl.
Retrieved on 12109/2013.
Russia's
Road
http://perminant.access.

to
Corruption.
(2000).
Retrieved
gpo. gov IIps613 2/russisroadtocorruption. pdf, on22/31 1O.

from

Schnepp, Otto. (2008). U.S.-China Technology Transfer: Problems and Solutions: Woodrow
Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution. Washington.
Stumbaum,U. Britt, Mat. (2009). Risky Business, The EU-China dual Use Technology
Transfer. European Union Institute of Security Studies. Occasional Paper. Retrieved from:
www.iss.europa.eu.pdf.
Tyson, Scott, Ann. (1997). Nuclear Deal Tightens U.S.-China Ties. Retrieved from
http://www.csmonitor.comldurable/1997
1 10/30/intl. 7 .html, on 25/5/2001.
U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues. (2011). CRS Report.
US-China
cooperation
agreement
(transcript).
(1985).
Retrieved
http://findarticles.comlp/articles/mi
ml079/is v85/ai 3956329/, on 25/6.2014.

from

Washington Post, 19 December 1989, AI..
Weeks, Jennifer. (1997). US-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Testimony before
Congress Committee. Retrieved
.
fromhttp://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/3250/uschina_nuclear_cooperation
_agree
ment.html, on25/5/200 I.
Work Begins on Nuclear Security Center in China. (2013). Retrieved from
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-china-nuclear-security-cooperation-concerns-some/,
12/06/14.

on

Yuan, Dond, Jing. (1996). United States Technology Transfer Policy towards China: postCold War Objectives and Strategies. International Journal, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 314-338.
Yuan, Dong, Jing. (1995). The Politics of the Strategic Triangle: the United States, COCOM
and Export Control on China. Journal of Northeast Asian Studies. 4, pp. 47-79.
Yuan, Dong, Jing. (2003). Sino-US military relations since Tiananrnen: Restoration, Progress,
and Pitfalls. Parameters.

82
Published by iRepository, June 2021

